Get Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal PDF

By James B. Freeman

ISBN-10: 0511082126

ISBN-13: 9780511082122

ISBN-10: 0521833019

ISBN-13: 9780521833011

Whilst, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an issue? what's the right criterion of premise acceptability? delivering a entire concept of premise acceptability, this e-book solutions those questions from an epistemological strategy that the writer calls "common feel foundationalism". His paintings can be of curiosity to experts in casual common sense, serious pondering and argumentation conception in addition to to a broader diversity of philosophers and people instructing rhetoric.

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Additional resources for Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem

Sample text

In formal logic, whether or not a given statement is derivable in the sense that it may appear on the last line of a derivation will depend in general on what assumptions we have to derive it from. This depending on assumptions in no way indicates that the rules of derivation are somehow relative, or context dependent, or contingent on the perspectives or decisions of those constructing derivations. 4 Speaking of interchanges presents us with the second illuminating feature of Pinto’s definition: “presumption” is basically a dialectical notion.

Our first step will be to look at principles of presumption that have actually been advanced and accepted. We have already noted two, a presumption in favor of the senses and in favor of memory. Before proceeding to our basic survey of the principles of presumption, we must develop a point implicit in the preceding paragraph. Rescher speaks of the rational legitimation of a presumptively justified belief. This suggests a distinction between presumptively justified beliefs, and establishing that there is a presumption for such beliefs.

In (1977a), Rescher defines burden of proof this way: “To say that the burden of proof rests with a certain side is to say that it is up to that side to bring in the evidence to make its case” (1977a, p. 26). By contrast, when there is a presumption in favor of a statement, then in the absence of specific counterindications, the challenger may accept it (1977a, p. 30). Rescher points out that presumptions are not indefeasible statements constituting some apodictic epistemic foundation for the rest of knowledge (1977a, p.

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Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem by James B. Freeman

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